The uprising followed a period in which German administrators and settlers were imposing tighter controls over African labour, movement, land transactions, and political authority. In Okahandja, the aggressive actions of the district administrator Zűrn generated considerable tension in January 1904. Although some Herero leaders were initially reluctant to join, the conflict spread rapidly from this local crisis to other parts of central Namibia.

After fighting broke out on 12 January, Herero fighters attacked settlements across central Namibia. They wrecked most of the 267 white farms in the area, assaulted towns and villages, destroyed or attacked telegraph lines and the Windhoek–Swakopmund railway, and besieged German fortifications. Windhoek, Okahandja, Omaruru, Otjimbingwe, Gobabis, and Outjo were all drawn into the first phase of the conflict.

The revolt temporarily transformed the military and political balance. With armed Herero forces in effective possession of central Namibia, the governor and much of the German armed force were about twenty days’ march away, and the settler population was thrown into panic. German troops later regained positions, but the early campaign demonstrated that the colonial order built during the preceding decade was vulnerable.

Samuel Maharero exercised strong command during the uprising. Herero forces operated with considerable discipline and coordination, achieved rapid military success, and generally followed instructions to spare Africans from other ethnic groups, white women and children, missionaries, and non-German men. The revolt was therefore both a military challenge to German rule and an attempt to defend Herero land, political authority, and pastoral society.

The Herero uprising began within the wider crisis of German colonial rule in South West Africa. The notes associate that crisis with land alienation, labour practices, settlement expansion, and the conduct of German officials. They also record that the uprising spread rapidly after violence and overreactions involving German military personnel, although the precise sequence remains debated.

One interpretation cited in the notes treats the rising as pre-planned, while another argues that it was spontaneous and resulted from a series of German overreactions. The evidence is not presented as settled. The notes specifically caution that the rapid spread of the revolt and the effectiveness of the German military response should be considered when evaluating claims of prior planning.

The uprising developed into a large military campaign involving Herero fighters and associated civilian populations. A cited estimate places the Herero population in the “fear area” at approximately 50,000 people, while another estimate gives a total of 50,000 to 60,000 Herero, including about 6,000 armed men. These figures are explicitly treated as estimates rather than definitive counts.

The German response culminated in the campaign associated with Waterberg and the dispersal of Herero forces toward the Omaheke. The notes discuss the use of a proclamation ordering severe treatment of those defined as responsible for attacks on whites, as well as later scholarship on extermination, shooting, and the destruction of civilian life.